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Abstract
This article quantifies personal income tax compliance by regions for the first time in
Spain and identifies the factors explaining differences in tax compliance between
regions, an aspect that has scarcely been analyzed in the literature. To this end, and
in addition to the dynamic and spatial components considered by Alm and Yunus,
this article considers the variables included in the classical tax evasion model of
Allingham and Sandmo, as well as tax morale and political-institutional variables,
including those linked to the country’s fiscal decentralization. The results obtained
confirm, on one hand, those reached in the very extensive literature studying tax
evasion from the individual perspective (including the importance of the dynamic
element) and, on the other, the relevance of the spatial component in explaining tax
compliance, so that greater or lesser tax compliance is partly explained by factors
such as the tax behavior of neighbors or how those neighbors are treated by the
public sector.
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Introduction
Personal income taxes are usually based on self-assessment systems, in which indi-
viduals voluntarily report the income they obtained over the tax period, determine
their tax liability, and then pay the tax. The voluntary nature of tax compliance
makes that occasionally tax compliance is less than total. This may be due, in the
first place, to the taxpayer failing to comply with tax laws and engaging in tax
evasion, either because the tax return is not filed (nonfiling gap), because not all
income is declared (underreporting gap), or because not all of the tax payable is paid
(underpayment gap). Second, the taxpayer can perform legal tax avoidance activi-
ties, such as income shifting or tax deferral, which also reduce compliance. The
difference between what taxpayers actually pay and what they should be paying
without tax evasion or avoidance (commonly referred to as a tax gap) is an indicator
of the degree of tax compliance. In this article, we are interested in the part of the
noncompliance due to tax evasion.
The economic and social consequences of tax evasion are of great relevance for
any economy, in terms of equity and efficiency. Tax evasion leads to budget deficits
that force spending cuts or higher taxes; it leads to poorly allocated resources when
the tax cheaters change their behavior regarding investments, working hours, and so
on; it alters income distribution, insofar as some taxpayers exploit the tax system
better than others; it leads to mistrust of the law and institutions and a loss of
collective values; it affects the identification of the beneficiaries of public services
and benefits; its presence means that governments must allocate resources to detect-
ing noncompliance, measuring its scale and penalizing it; and it affects the quality of
macroeconomic statistics (Alm and Soled 2017). Additionally, tax evasion repre-
sents a taxpayer behavior at least as important as changes in labor or saving supply
(Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012; Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 2014). For all these
reasons, attempts to quantify, explain, and reduce tax evasion have been a constant,
especially in developed economies.
Since the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), a very large amount of theo-
retical and empirical literature on tax evasion has been produced (see, e.g., the
reviews of Andreoni, Erard, and Feldstein 1998; Hashimzade, Myles, and Tran-
Nam 2013; Slemrod 2017; Alm 2019). However, studies that deal with tax evasion
at the intermediate (state or regional) levels are more recent and scarce. Only a few
papers have estimated differences in tax compliance at the regional level. As we will
see shortly, these studies refer to decentralized and federal countries, which is
logical, since it is in those countries where the regional perspective is more inter-
esting. Our aim with this article is to add to the literature the analysis of another
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federal country, Spain, which has particularities that differentiate it from those
others, estimating the differences in compliance among Spanish regions in personal
income tax and making some contributions to which we will refer below.
For the United States, various authors have used the information provided by the
Internal Revenue Service to estimate compliance in the federal personal income tax.
At the state level, Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1987, 1990) do this for the years 1977–
1986; Plumley (1996) for the period 1982–1991. At the level of the first three digits
of the US zip code, we can mention the works of Witte and Woodbury (1985) and
Dubin and Wilde (1988), both for 1969, and Gentry and Kahn (2009) for 2001. All
these papers consider various factors in the explanation of tax evasion, linked to the
static tax evasion model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972): audit intensity, effective
tax rate, productive structure, education, age, unemployment, income, and so on, and
also some variables relating to tax morale or political attitudes.
Alm and Yunus (2009) extend the tax evasion model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) to include the spatial dimension and estimate the factors explaining evasion
in US federal income tax at the state level from 1979 to 1997, taking into account
that tax compliance in a state may depend on tax compliance in the neighboring
states. Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2017) also analyze, in the context of personal
income tax, how an individual’s tax behavior depends on the information he or she
has on what his or her neighbors are doing although they do this by conducting
laboratory experiments with American college students. Spatial dependence may be
due to taxpayers exchanging information among themselves, so that if a taxpayer
commits tax evasion and is not detected by the tax authority, this can lead others to
also evade, although it could also have the opposite effect, by increasing the prob-
ability of being caught if the other person got away with it. McFadden (2006)
suggests that individuals may act by simply imitating others in tax matters. Social
norms may also generate spatial dependence in the decision to evade, insofar as they
may set a standard for taxpayer behavior: individuals will be compliant if they
believe tax compliance is the social norm and behave differently if the opposite if
true (Gordon 1989; Posner 2000; Sandmo 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2011; Alm
2019; Besley, Jensen, and Persson 2019). Estimates not considering the magnitude
of spatial variation in tax evasion would be misleading and only partially informa-
tive, especially in the presence of significant regional diversity about economic
fundamentals, so that the model would not adequately report the true factors behind
tax evasion,1 and therefore, it would not correctly guide the policies against income
tax fraud.
Later, Di Caro and Nicotra (2014) for the period 2007–2011, and Carfora, Vega,
and Pisani (2018) for the period 2001–2011, analyze tax compliance for the Italian
regions, also using spatial econometric models, although the paper of Carfora, Vega,
and Pisani (2018) is not limited to income tax but analyzes total tax gap.
The cited paper by Alm and Yunus (2009) has a special interest because, as well
as adding the spatial dimension to the analysis of tax evasion, it includes its dynamic
component (already present in the original contribution of Allingham and Sandmo
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1972), that is, the fact that the degree of tax compliance in a region may depend on
its compliance in previous years.2 Carfora, Vega, and Pisani (2018) also take into
account the dynamic component of tax evasion but independently of the spatial
component. The dynamic component should not be ignored in estimates of tax
evasion, since it can explain part of the evasive behavior of the taxpayers. Individ-
uals tend to repeat their patterns and behaviors because of the cost of adjustment that
changes in behavior entail. In addition, morality, which is one of the factors explain-
ing tax evasion, is persistent over time. It also seems reasonable to consider that if a
taxpayer evades tax in one year and is not detected, he or she will probably evade in
the following year. When the problem being analyzed has a dynamic dimension, it is
necessary to include it in the analysis not to produce biased estimators.
For the Swiss cantons, Feld and Frey (2006) consider that the available evidence
supports the existence of a “psychological tax contract” between the administrations
and the citizens, so that direct democracy and respectful treatment of taxpayers are
factors that foster the citizens’ tax morale and thus tax compliance.
There are no studies on tax compliance at the regional level in Spain, so in this
article, we will fill this gap in the literature, quantifying compliance in personal
income tax (Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fı́sicas [IRPF]) at the regional
level for Spain and estimating econometrically the factors explaining the differences
in tax compliance between regions (Comunidades Autónomas [ACs]). The study is
limited to the “common regime” ACs, since the “foral regime” ACs (Navarre and the
Basque Country) have a different tax system from the others, and we do not have the
necessary information to include them in the analysis. IRPF is a tax partly decen-
tralized to the ACs. From 1994, the ACs received a share of 15 percent of the IRPF
paid by residents in their respective territories. After 1997, a further 15 percent was
assigned by the State to the ACs as an autonomic (“ceded”) tax. The assigned
percentage was increased to 33 percent from 2002 (when the initial tax share dis-
appeared) and to 50 percent from 2009. Central government has the power to
regulate the tax base, that is common to central and regional IRPF, and to manage
both central and autonomic taxes. The regions have the power to legislate on the
autonomic tax rate and certain autonomic tax credits.3
Our research includes several contributions to the empirical literature on tax
evasion. First, this is the first study that quantifies the degree of compliance with
IRPF in each AC and estimates the factors that explain the difference in compliance
between regions.
Second, the exercises presented in this article expand on the results provided by
the estimates carried out for other federal countries. Spain has some characteristics
that place this country in an intermediate position between the United States and
Switzerland, on the one hand, and Italy on the other. Although with notable differ-
ences between them, the United States and Switzerland are two countries with
greater decentralization than Spain, both in terms of expenditure and, above all,
revenue, and Spain is more decentralized than Italy (see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
federalism/fiscal-decentralisation-database.htm#C_3). The American states and
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Swiss cantons have extensive powers in the design and administration of their
personal income tax, while in Spain (and even more so in Italy), the powers of the
regions are, as we have seen, more limited, and the personal income tax is managed
by the central administration. However, while Spain, Italy, and Switzerland apply
equalization systems among their regional governments, the United States abolished
its General Revenue Sharing in 1986 and does not currently apply a system of
equalization grants to the states. In the latter country, interregional differences in
disposable income inequality are lower than in the other three, with Italy being the
country with the greatest disparities (Adalet and San Millán 2019). Finally, in Italy
and Spain, the mobility of households within the country is much lower than in the
United States and Switzerland (Caldera-Sánchez and Andrews 2011).
The above characteristics may help to explain some peculiarities of regional tax
compliance in Spain. On the one hand, the literature has shown that there is a
positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and tax compliance (Torgler
and Werner 2005; Torgler, Schneider, and Schaltegger 2010). Consequently, we can
expect that the increase in decentralization experienced by Spain in the period
studied has translated into an improvement in tax compliance. On the other hand,
the above information suggests that in Spain, there is more concern about regional
differences and how the public sector corrects them than in Switzerland and the
United States. In the latter country in particular, regional differences are less than in
the others, do not seem to be of such concern, and are addressed more by mobility
than by public intervention. If the above is true, the spatial dimension has to be
especially important in the study of tax compliance in Spain, since the differences
(real or perceived) in the treatment of ACs by central government policies can be
projected into differences in the degree of tax compliance between regions.
The third contribution of our article concerns the specification of the regional tax
compliance model. Unlike Alm and Yunus (2009), in whose application the depen-
dent variable is the federal tax evaded, in our model, the dependent variable is the
ratio of declared income to actual income, which affects both the central and
regional IRPF. With respect to exogenous variables, we rely on several groups of
factors: those relating to the classical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), those
linked to tax morale and political-institutional factors, and persistence and spatiality
factors, which, as far as we know, after Alm and Yunus (2009) have not been
considered again in this joint form in any applied work on the subject.
Both the spatial and dynamic factors are relevant in the Spanish case. With
regard to spatial dependence, the degree of economic interdependence of the
regions is very high, especially among the closest ones. It seems clear that certain
collectives of taxpayers (such as professionals, business people, executives),
which are those most related to the concealment of tax bases, have information
on the activity of the Tax Agency (whose competences extend to the entire national
territory) and the degree of compliance of these collectives in other regions and
that this information may affect the decisions they take on their own degree of
compliance. And with regard to the dynamic component, it seems clear that tax
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behavior of taxpayers in a region today depends on what they did in the past. The
success in tax evasion by a taxpayer in previous years will positively affect the
decision to evade in the current year. Similarly, if the tax administration detects a
taxpayer’s evasion, the taxpayer’s behavior will change for subsequent years.
Later, we will show how the estimates are altered if spatiality and persistence are
not taken into account in the analysis.
And fourth, from a methodological perspective, our article represents an advance
with respect to Alm and Yunus (2009), to the extent that we apply several model
selection criteria, which point to a model with spatial dependence on endogenous
and explanatory variables, specifically a dynamic spatial Durbin model (SDM), and
we perform a maximum likelihood estimate using spatial econometrics techniques,
which take into account both spatial and dynamic effects simultaneously and in an
unbiased and consistent way (Belotti, Hughes, and Mortari 2017). As Alm and
Yunus (2009) pointed out, a unified approach for considering both spatial and
dynamic effects was not available at that time, so they used a simpler alternative
method.4 However, as Anselin (1988) points out, the existence of a functional
relationship between what happens at a certain point in space and what happens
in another place demands more complex and specific techniques of spatial econo-
metrics. Moreover, we use Driscoll–Kraay standard errors because it is necessary to
introduce a nonparametric estimator of the covariance matrix that provides consis-
tent standard errors against heteroscedasticity in presence of the usual patterns of
spatial and temporal dependence (Hoechle 2007).
After this Introduction, this paper is structured in the following sections. The
second section quantifies the degree of IRPF compliance in the Spanish ACs from
2003 to 2014, using a macroeconomic approach that measures the gap between the
income reported by taxpayers in each region in their IRPF returns and the income
recorded in Spain’s regional accounts. The third section offers an econometric
estimate of the factors explaining regional IRPF compliance. The first part of this
section presents the theoretical model, based on Alm and Yunus (2009), the second
presents the adopted specification, while the third part explains the estimates and
discusses the results. All groups of factors considered are relevant for explaining the
differences in tax compliance among ACs. Both the spatial and the dynamic com-
ponent are found to be significant. The fourth section summarizes the main results
obtained and their policy implications.
A Quantification of the Degree of Spanish IRPF Compliance
by Regions
Unlike other countries, Spain does not have any quantification of personal income
tax compliance by regions.5 In this section, we will calculate this for the first time for
the period 2003-–2014, using the macroeconomic approach already used by the
Comisión del Fraude Fiscal (1988 [Tax Fraud Commission]; see also Lagares
1990) to estimate evasion in Spanish IRPF at the national level from 1979 to
6 International Regional Science Review XX(X)
1987.6 Essentially, this means comparing the income reported in the IRPF by the
taxpayers (which we will call “fiscal income”), grouped by ACs, with the income
aggregated by regions as recorded in the Official Spanish Regional Accounts (which
we will call “real income”) and express this comparison in the form of a quotient.7
The fiscal income of individuals is obtained from the samples of IRPF filers and
nonfilers (Muestras de Declarantes y Muestras de no Obligados no Declarantes del
IRPF), published by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales,
IEF, Ministry of Finance), which contain microdata information from the fifteen
common regime regions’ taxpayers. The IRPF samples contain the income
reported to the Tax Agency by the taxpayers in the different components of the
tax base: wages and salaries, capital income, real estate income, and income from
self-employed and business owners.
The real income of individuals is calculated based on the Household Income
Accounts of Spanish Regional Accounts (Contabilidad Regional de España), which
are macrodata built according to the methodology established in the European
System of National and Regional Accounts established by Regulation EU (SEC-
2010).8 Regional Accounts contain the income generated by households in each
region computed according to the SEC-2010 regulations: wages and salaries, gross
operating surplus, and mixed income. Regional household income calculated in this
way is the best proxy we can find for the real income generated in a region. This
income may or may not have been declared by the taxpayers in their IRPF returns.
The ratio of fiscal income to real income will then be a good proxy for the tax
compliance level.
The databases have been harmonized, so that the components of taxable income
in IRPF are as close as possible to the income recorded in the Regional Accounts, in
such a way that the differences between them that are not due to tax compliance are
not relevant.9
It is true that part of the difference between real income and fiscal income will be
due to the existence of legal tax avoidance, but the most significant part of the total
gap will be explained by tax evasion because, to a large extent, tax avoidance
strategies do not alter the aggregate income reported in each region (although the
tax paid will change). One of the most important avoidance strategies in IRPF is
income shifting, for example, between labor and capital income (López-Laborda,
Vallés-Giménez, and Zárate-Marco 2018), but its effects are neutralized when cal-
culating the total income declared by each taxpayer. Another avoidance strategy is
the income splitting among taxpayers, for example, among family members. To the
extent that these people reside in the same region, the aggregation of declared rents
also neutralizes the effects of this strategy.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of tax compliance by regions from 2003 to 2014,
calculated as the quotient between fiscal income and real income. The results
obtained must be taken as an approximation of the level of tax compliance in each
region and its evolution, as despite having adjusted the databases used, it is impos-
sible to ensure they are totally homogeneous.
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The evolution of tax compliance is similar in all the ACs: it rises from 2003 to
2014 in all the regions (except Catalonia where it falls by 0.6 percentage points),
despite the overall drop in 2011 and 2012. The lowest growth is in Madrid, with 1.8
percentage points, and the greatest in Extremadura, with 12.8 percentage points.
There are two regions whose compliance levels are clearly lower than the others
throughout the period (both in labor income and in income from other taxed
sources): the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands; plus Catalonia from 2009.
Asturias stands at the top of the list, with compliance generally higher than the other
ACs in the period examined. In any case, the dispersion of compliance levels
between regions is not high. The standard deviation does not exceed 4 percentage
points in any year and hardly reaches 3 points if we exclude the Balearic Islands
from the calculation. However, the socioeconomic characteristics of the “common
regime” ACs are very different. Madrid and Catalonia are the regions with higher
per capita income (33,809 and 29,936 current euros of 2014, respectively), and
Extremadura and Andalusia are in the opposite end (€17,262 and €18,470). Anda-
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Figure 1. Evolution of IRPF compliance by autonomous communities, 2003–2014. IRPF ¼
Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fı́sicas.
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surface (87,599 km2), and La Rioja is the smallest AC in population (313,582
inhabitants) and almost in surface (5,045 km2), being only surpassed by the Balearic
Island (4,992 km2).
Figure 2 shows the degree of compliance for the aggregate of the fifteen
“common regime” regions, which is also broken down by the two items permitted
by the available information: labor income and other income (from movable capital,
real state, and self-employed and business owners). Tax compliance is always high
in labor income and fairly stable: around 90 percent. In contrast, compliance in other
income is low throughout the period. It increased from 29.9 percent in 2003 to 45.3
percent in 2009 and then fell to 35.0 percent in 2014. For total income, the profile is
as shown in Figure 1. The aggregate tax compliance percentage is 69.3 percent in
2003 and 76.2 percent in 2014.
There is no empirical evidence to compare with our results by ACs. At the
national level, the Comisión del Fraude Fiscal (1988) published figures for the years
1979–1986, using real income as provided by the Spanish National Accounts (Con-
tabilidad Nacional de España) and applying a methodology that is not entirely
consistent with that of our research. Figure 2 compares the results of both researches.
According to the Comisión del Fraude Fiscal, in 1986, Spaniards resident in the
“common regime” regions declared 55.1 percent of total income obtained, reaching
tax compliance values of 71.3 percent for labor income and 30.4 percent for other
income. The results we obtained seventeen years later show tax compliance at 69.3
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Figure 2. Evolution of IRPF compliance by income sources, 1979–1986 and 2003–2014. IRPF
¼ Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fı́sicas.
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improvement in compliance in labor income, which reached 90.1 percent in 2003, as
the degree of compliance in other income is practically the same in that year as in
1986: 29.9 percent. Given these results, it seems that the main advances in personal
income tax compliance in Spain have taken place in the income that was previously
more monitored and hence less prone to concealment.
More recently, Pulido (2014), using a similar but not identical methodology to
that of the Comisión del Fraude Fiscal, calculated the degree of income tax com-
pliance from 2003 to 2012 for all income, obtaining higher results than ours for the
first four years. We have included his estimation in Figure 2.
Other researches have used different methodologies to estimate IRPF compliance
in Spain. Esteller (2005) estimates stochastic frontiers at the local (provincial) level,
obtaining an average IRPF compliance level of 82.2 percent for 1993–2000. Domı́n-
guez-Barrero, López-Laborda, and Rodrigo-Sauco (2015, 2017) estimate evasion in
the IRPF for the period 2005–2008 by income sources, applying the methodology of
Feldman and Slemrod (2007)—which is itself an adaptation of the approach of
Pissarides and Weber (1989)—which looks for traces of fraudulent taxpayer beha-
vior in the relationship between some of the items they recorded on their tax return
(such as charitable contributions) and the income they report. For the average of
diverse scenarios in 2008, assuming that there is no evasion in income from pen-
sions, Domı́nguez-Barrero, López-Laborda, and Rodrigo-Sauco (2015) obtain full
compliance in labor income and much less in other income categories: 39.08 percent
in capital income, 45.53 percent in real estate income, 52.60 percent in business and
professional income calculated under a direct assessment scheme, and 54.79 percent
when this last income is calculated under an objective assessment scheme.
Estimates of the Factors Explaining IRPF Compliance
in Regions
In this section, we will estimate the factors explaining the degree of tax compliance
(or, from another point of view, the level of tax evasion) by ACs which we have
quantified in the previous section. The first part of the section presents the theore-
tical model on which the applied exercise is based. The second describes the spe-
cification used and the independent variables considered. The third part will contain
the estimates and discuss the results obtained.
Theoretical Model
The theoretical framework is based on the classic Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki
model (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Yitzhaki 1974), with the adaptation proposed
by Alm and Yunus (2009) to include the dynamic and spatial components.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) develop a model that combines the economics of
crime and the economics of risk and uncertainty. An individual decides whether he
or she is going to evade part or all of the income he or she has obtained and does so
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maximizing its expected utility, which is a weighted average of the utility attained in
the two situations that can arise, the weights being the respective probabilities he or
she assigns to each situation. In the first situation, evasion is not detected, so the
individual only has to pay the income tax corresponding to the reported income. In
the second situation, the Tax Agency detects the evasion so that, in addition to the
tax, the individual has to pay a fine (which, according to Yitzhaki [1974], is estab-
lished on the evaded tax).
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) themselves recognize the simplicity of their basic
model and note various extensions to it, two of which interest us here. First, they
point out that the decision to evade taxes may be affected by the reputation of the
individual as a member of a community. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) introduce
this reputational factor as an additional argument in the utility function of the
individual. More recently, Sandmo (2005) suggests that the individual’s subjective
probability that his or her evasion is detected may depend on the tax-evading beha-
vior of everybody else. Second, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) also study the
dynamic component in the decision to evade, assuming that when an individual is
audited, the evasion he or she committed in that period and eventually also in all
previous periods is detected so he or she will have to pay a fine corresponding to all
the concealed income.
Alm and Yunus (2009) introduce the elements of persistence and spatial depen-
dence through the subjective probability of detecting fraud, pit Eit1Ejt
 
, which will
depend on the income which the taxpayer successfully evaded in the previous
period, Eit1, and the income evaded in the current period by another “average
taxpayer,” Ejt, with j 6¼ i.
Taxpayer i will declare in period t the income Xit ¼ Yit  Eit which maximizes
his or her expected utility:
E Uitð Þ ¼ 1 pit Eit1Ejt
  
Uit Yit  tit Yit  Eitð Þð Þ
þ pit Eit1Ejt
 
Uit Yit  titYit  qittitEitð Þ
¼ 1 pit Eit1Ejt
  




where Yit is the taxpayer’s real income i in the tax period t, tit is the IRPF tax rate, qit
is the fine, which is imposed on the evaded tax, Wi1 is the individual i’s after-tax
income if not caught cheating Wi1 ¼ Yit  tit Yit  Eitð Þð Þ, and Wi2 is the individual
i’s after-tax income if caught cheating ðWi2 ¼ Yit  titYit  qittitEitÞ.
Following Alm and Yunus (2009), the effect of Eit1 and Ejt on Eit will be
obtained differentiating the first-order condition of the problem (equation [1]),














































it > 0 is the first partial derivative of Uit with respect to income and
U
00
it < 0 is the second partial derivative. The first quotient on the right side of
equations (2) and (3) is negative, so the effect of an individual’s behavior the
previous year on his or her tax evasion the current year will depend on how the
probability of detection varies as the previously evaded income varies, that is,
dpit Eit1Ejtð Þ
dEit1
. Similarly, the effect on the tax evasion of an individual in a given year
of the contemporaneous behavior of the average taxpayer, j, will depend on how the
probability of detection varies as the income evaded by that taxpayer j varies, that is,
dpit Eit1Ejtð Þ
dEjt
. The hypothesis which seems most realistic to us is that both derivatives
are negative: a greater successful evasion the previous year or more contempora-
neous evasion by other taxpayers will reduce the subjective probability of detecting
evasion in the current period.
Consequently, the utility maximizing problem for individual i will have the
following general functional form:
Eit ¼ f Eit1;Ejt; Zit; Zjt
 
: ð4Þ
In other words, the evaded income, Eit, depends on the dynamic behavior of the
individual i, through Eit1; on the behavior of other taxpayers, through Ejt; and on a
set of factors of the individual i, Zit, and the other taxpayers, Zjt, including those in
the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model—that is, income, tax rate, the probability
of detection, and fines—but also factors relating to tax morale or political and
institutional aspects (such as decentralization in Spain). As we have already men-
tioned above, all of these variables have been examined in the theoretical and
applied literature to complete the seminal tax evasion model.
Specifications
To identify the factors explaining differences in IRPF compliance between regions,
we consider a panel of the fifteen common regime regions in the period 2003–2014
and estimate a spatial and dynamic model. It is a spatial model because it takes into
consideration that tax compliance in a region may depend on compliance in the other
regions, on certain explanatory variables in neighboring regions10 and also on a
combination of omitted variables that may be spatially correlated. And it is also a
dynamic model because it considers that compliance in one year may depend on past
experience, based on the idea that the tax compliance decision is serially correlated
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because of the adjustment cost caused by a sudden change in the taxpayer’s filing
decision.


















The dependent variable is Cit, which measures the degree of income tax com-
pliance in the region i (i¼ 1, . . . , 15) in the year t (t¼ 2003, . . . , 2014), calculated as
explained in the previous section; r is a scalar parameter, called autoregressive
spatial coefficient or spatial lag coefficient, which measures the slope of the reaction
function or the spatial effect; !ij are the spatial weights used to calculate the effect of
tax compliance in region j on region i, where oij 6¼ 0, if regions i and j interact, and
by definition wii ¼ 0; zik are the k socioeconomic characteristics of the region or
representative individual i; and zjs, are the s characteristics of the neighboring
regions j. Thus, bk are the k coefficients of the variables z of the individual or region
i, fs are the s spatial coefficients of local dependence which capture the spatial effect
of the explanatory variables of the neighbors in each observation and g is the
coefficient of persistence on compliance or dynamic component. We will assume
that r, g, fs, and bk are constant in space and time. di reflects the specific effect of
each individual or region and l is the coefficient of spatial autocorrelation of error,
with uit ¼ eit in the absence of spatial dependence in the error term.
The explanatory variables of tax compliance which we introduce in the model are
grouped in several blocks. The definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used
in the estimates can be seen in Tables 1A and 2A of Online Appendix, respectively. The
correlation analysis between the variables is shown in Tables 3.1A and 3.2A.
Variables in the Allingham–Sandmo model. The first block includes the variables relat-
ing to the classic tax evasion model described in Theoretical Model section. We have
included several variables relating to the probability of detection of fraudulent
behavior:11 the percentage of companies in the region without salaried workers
(nonsalaried), the percentage of taxpayers reporting income from self-
employment (enterpreneurs), the percentage of taxpayers reporting labor income
(employees), the weight of income subject to withholding in the Regional Accounts
(withholding), and taxpayers’ perception of the link between monitoring and tax
compliance (probdetection). This last is a qualitative variable which, as can be seen
in Table 1A of Online Appendix, takes values from 1 to 4. Each of the first two
López-Laborda et al. 13
variables is associated with a low probability of detection, so that, in accordance
with Allingham and Sandmo (1972), we expect them to have a negative influence on
regional tax compliance. In contrast, the other three variables are expected to have a
positive influence on the compliance level.
We have also included two variables relating to the penalties imposed when
evasion is detected. The first represents the ratio between penalties plus enforcement
surcharges12 and the total tax revenue collected in each region for direct and indirect
taxes, levies, and other revenue managed by the national Tax Agency (penalty). The
second variable is the weight of revenue from IRPF audits plus the tax payable from
returns submitted after the deadline and other items in the IRPF tax payable in each
region (auditrevenues). We have lagged these variables by one period, as we under-
stand that their effects will be produced on returns of the following year, as Advani,
Elming, and Shaw (2017) consider for inspection rates in the UK. In both cases, we
expect them to have a positive effect on compliance.
Table 1. Results of Estimating Regional IRPF Compliance with a Dynamic SDM with Regional
Fixed Effects and Temporal Dummies.
Dynamic SDM















Spatial correlation coefficient (r) 0.27**
Variance sigma2_e 0.49**






Note: IRPF ¼ Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fı́sicas; SDM ¼ spatial Durbin model.
**Significance at 5 percent.
*Significance at 10 percent.
14 International Regional Science Review XX(X)
We have incorporated the average (national plus regional) IRPF tax rate (avera-
getr), which we have lagged one period, and the logarithm of per capita income
(income) of the region. The sign of both these variables is expected to be undeter-
mined. In the framework of the Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki model (i.e., with fines
imposed on evaded tax payments), and in a context of decreasing absolute risk aver-
sion, it is true that larger tax rates reduce evasion. However, the literature has demon-
strated that if factors relating to, for example, taxpayers’ honesty or social norms are
added to the model, the relationship between tax rates and evasion could be ambiguous
(Gordon 1989). Similarly, in this framework of decreasing absolute risk aversion, an
increase in individual income increases the volume of evaded income, but the effect on
the percentage of evaded income depends on relative risk aversion.
Tax morale variables. Based on the plenty literature that shows that the dissuasion
model is insufficient to explain tax compliance (e.g., Torgler 2007), we have gath-
ered a series of variables relating to tax morale: a qualitative variable, justified, with
value between 0 and 1, which indicates how far citizens consider justifications to
exist for evasion; the number of people convicted per thousand inhabitants in each
region (sentenced); another qualitative variable, civicduty, with value from 1 to 4,
which measures taxpayers’ perception of the link between the civic duty to pay taxes
and tax compliance, and the percentage of the population with secondary education
(educ). We expect a negative sign for the coefficients of the first two variables, and
positive for the last two.
Table 2. Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of the Explanatory Variables.
Variables
Short-term effects Long-term effects
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
nonsalaried 0.46** 0.16** 0.63** 1.03** 1.15** 2.18**
withholding 0.15** 0.05** 0.20** 0.34** 0.38* 0.71**
auditrevenues_1 0.29** 0.10** 0.39** 0.64** 0.72 1.35*
averagetr_1 0.10* 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.45
sentenced 0.46** 0.16** 0.62** 1.01** 1.13** 2.15**
balance_1 0.06** 0.15** 0.10** 0.11** 0.44** 0.33*
satis_1 0.42** 0.15** 0.56** 0.93** 1.04* 1.96**
management 0.22** 0.08** 0.30** 0.49** 0.55** 1.04**
taxamnesty 0.99** 0.35** 1.34** 2.20** 2.46** 4.66**
dreform 2.48** 0.87** 3.35** 5.49** 6.16** 11.65**
maxtr 0.11** 0.04** 0.15** 0.25** 0.28** 0.54**
raisedtr 0.31** 0.11** 0.42** 0.68** 0.76* 1.45**
dcession 1.43** 0.50** 1.93** 3.16** 3.54** 6.70**
crisis 1.63** 0.57** 2.20** 3.60** 4.04** 7.64**
**Significance at 5 percent.
*Significance at 10 percent.
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We have also added some variables indicative of the relationship between the
benefits of public spending as perceived by the citizen and the taxes they have paid,
as this can influence the tax morale of citizens and thus their compliance (Falkinger
1988; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). For this, we introduced the “fiscal balance” of
each region (i.e., the difference between the expenditure executed and the revenues
obtained by the central level in the region) in terms of gross domestic product (GDP;
balance), lagged one period; a dummy which takes the value 1 when the citizens in
the region are on average quite satisfied with the public services they use (satis) and
0 otherwise; a qualitative variable, management, with value from 1 to 4, which
captures to what extent citizens believe that public services are managed correctly;
and the percentage of the population aged over sixty-five (oldpop), given that this
segment of the population receives a large part of public spending, in the form of
pensions, care, and healthcare. We assigned an expected positive sign to the coeffi-
cients of these four variables.
Political and institutional variables. In accordance with the literature, a block of political
and institutional variables was introduced in the specification, which can contribute
to explaining differences in tax compliance between regions. The political factors
that can influence tax compliance are the color of the ruling party (color), taking the
value 1 if left-wing and 0 otherwise; the percentage of votes obtained by the ruling
party (votes); and a dummy taking the value 1 if the government of the AC is
regionalist and 0 otherwise (reg). The coefficients of these variables have an a priori
undetermined sign.
The first group of institutional variables seeks to capture the possible influence of
fiscal decentralization on tax compliance. As explained above, in Spain, IRPF is
partly ceded to the ACs. Although regions have no power to manage the tax or to set
up the tax base, they can establish the tax rate of the regional IRPF, and some tax
credits. The IRPF is the tax that provides the greatest collection to the country and
the one that best represents the tax duties derived from belonging to a political
community. In this sense, it can be expected that the greater the degree of IRPF
decentralization, citizens will better perceive the relationship that exists between the
taxes they pay and the services they receive from regional governments, and they
will be more committed and motivated to comply with their tax responsibilities
(Torgler and Werner 2005; Torgler, Schneider, and Schaltegger 2010).
To reflect the effect of tax decentralization on the degree of compliance, we have
constructed the following variables: the maximum (maxtr) and minimum (mintr) tax
rates in the regional IRPF; a dummy which captures whether the region has exercised
regulatory responsibilities upward in the IRPF, raising the marginal maximum or
minimum tax rate (raisedtr); and a variable taking the value 1 starting from 2009,
when the amount of the IRPF ceded to ACs was raised from 33 percent to 50 percent
(dcession). The expected sign for the coefficients of the first three variables is
undetermined, and the fourth is positive: a greater tax decentralization could favor
citizens’ connection with the regional government, leading to more compliance.13
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There is another group of three institutional variables, which are common to all
regions, and consequently predict changes in the compliance of all regions. The first
one is taxamnesty, with value 1 in the years 2013 and 2014, after the approval of the
last tax amnesty in Spain, and 0 otherwise. On the one hand, an amnesty is expected
to improve tax compliance by incorporating individuals who have benefited from the
amnesty into the taxpayer census. On the other hand, an amnesty causes a compara-
tive grievance in favor of noncompliant taxpayers, who are offered advantageous
treatment after having cheated, with respect to those who have paid their taxes on
time. This can produce a crowding-out effect that favors noncompliance by reinfor-
cing extrinsic motivations for compliance—determined by inspections and fines—
and weakening intrinsic motivations—determined by morality or social norms
(López-Laborda and Rodrigo 2003; Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). The
expected sign for the coefficient of this variable is then undetermined.
The second is the dummy dreform, with value 1 in the years 2006–2014 and 0
otherwise. This variable tries to capture the effects that the IRPF reform of 2007 had
on the reported income of individuals. This reform substantially reduced tax rates on
capital income, especially for higher income taxpayers. For the same reasons given
above for the variable averagetr, we cannot assign a determined sign for the coeffi-
cient of dreform variable.
And the last institutional variable is a dummy which captures the recession years
at the national level (crisis). Anyway, the effect of the recession years can also be
taken into account through other alternative regional variables: the regional unem-
ployment rate (unemploy) and the GDP growth rate in each region (regional-
growth).14 All the variables, except income, were constructed in levels, and the
monetary variables were deflated.
Estimates and Results
We have first considered the potential endogeneity of certain independent variables
included in the model. Specifically, revenue from IRPF audits (auditrevenues) and
from penalties and enforcement surcharges (penalty), and the tax rates (averagetr,
maxtr, and mintr) as these variables may be conditioned by reported income. To this
end, we have applied the conventional endogeneity tests both through a linear model
where one or more of the regressors are endogenously determined (Durbin and Wu-
Hausman statistics) and additionally through the spatial and dynamic model we have
specified in equation (5) (Hausman test). Specifically, we perform the two-stage
Hausman (1978) procedure, using instrumental variables (IV). The instruments we
use are valid, that is, they are sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous
variables but not with the error term; following Wooldridge (2019), they are not
included in the model or are exogenous variables; and the used instrumental equa-
tions are nor misspecified. This is confirmed by the Sargan and Basman tests shown
in Table 4A of Online Appendix. In addition, we have completed the analysis of the
potential endogeneity of the suspicious variables, carrying out a test that considers
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all potentially endogenous variables simultaneously (joint endogeneity test). All
these tests are showed in Table 4A of Online Appendix, and they suggest we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the variables. Table 4A of Online Appen-
dix also shows the IVs used.
To test the potential spatial dependence of the model which we hypothesized in
the previous sections, we used the Pesaran and Moran tests (Hoyos and Sarafidis
2006). The results of which are presented in Table 5A of Online Appendix. Both
confirm the presence of spatial dependence, so for the estimators to be consistent,
spatial dependence models must be used, like those proposed in equation (5). These
spatial models take into account that the sample considered contains less information
than the uncorrelated samples usually used in econometrics, due to the fact that there
is a spatial correlation. To this end, a matrix of spatial weights must be constructed,
which describes the connectivity or neighborhood of regions exogenously (Anselin
2002) and is also significant enough to represent dependence in the endogenous
variable or the error term. If we consider that “everything is related to everything
else, but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970), and to avoid
the problem of isolated regions or ones with an excessive amount of neighbors, we
have defined neighbors as the five nearest regions in terms of distance, using a 15 
15 spatial matrix.15
Table 6A of Online Appendix summarizes the results of estimating regional IRPF
compliance with different fixed-effect models. We use fixed effects as they are more
appropriate for our data, as the sample used represents the entire taxpayer population
of the Spanish common regime regions rather than a random sample (Elhorst 2014).
Meanwhile, it must be realized that dynamic models require the inclusion of fixed
effects, without allowing for random effects. However, problems of simultaneity
have led us to incorporate, instead of temporary fixed effects, a set of temporal
variables related to specific events that involved economic/legal/structural changes
that make tax compliance move in a similar direction in all ACs and that, as the
model obtained shows, are going to be essential in the explanation of tax compliance
in the Spanish regions. This is the case of the institutional and economic cycle
variables taxamnesty, dreform, dcession, and crisis, the inclusion of which will also
improve the degrees of freedom in the estimates, as it implies a smaller number of
variables to be estimated. The fixed effects that we include in the analysis are,
therefore, individual fixed effects and capture the unobserved characteristics of each
region, that is, the characteristics that involve a differential behavior at the regional
level and that can also condition tax compliance. Specifically, we implement the
fixed effects variant of the SDM model using the bias corrected maximum likelihood
approach described in Yu, de Jong, and Lee (2008) and provide Driscoll–Kraay
standard errors against heteroscedasticity, in presence of the usual patterns of spatial
and temporal dependence.
The spatial correlation coefficient (r) and the coefficient of the explanatory
variable balance of the neighboring regions (f) are significant and have a clear
effect on tax compliance in the region i. Also, r is quite far from 1, so the equations
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are not very likely to have a unit root. The spatial autocorrelation model and the
spatial error model also show spatial dependence in the error term; however, the
Akaike information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion indicate that the
best specification is provided by the dynamic SDM, shown in the last column of
Table 6A, in which the spatial dimension derives from the endogenous and expla-
natory variables. As far as possible,16 this result is corroborated by the LR tests in
Table 7A and ratified by the tests of absence of spatial autocorrelation in the error
(LM error) and presence of spatial autocorrelation in the spatially lagged dependent
variable (LM lag) as shown in Table 8A. Meanwhile, the SDM lets us take into
account, as well as the spatial component, the dynamic component of the endogen-
ous variable, which was one of the purposes of our research.
Table 1 presents the selected dynamic SDM. In this model, the coefficient of the
dynamic component or persistence (g) is significant, which means that the average
taxpayer learns over time. His or her tax behavior today depends positively on what
he or she did in the past, as found by Alm and Yunus (2009) and Carfora, Vega, and
Pisani (2018), although in the latter, separately from spatial dependence. As men-
tioned above, the spatial correlation coefficient (r) is also significant, indicating that
there is a regional interaction in the tax compliance decision and that this interaction
is positive, the same result found by Alm and Yunus (2009) for the United States and
Carfora, Vega, and Pisani (2018) for Italy. Thus, greater tax compliance in neigh-
boring regions is associated with greater compliance in one’s own region.
The three groups of independent variables included in the specification were
found to be relevant in the explanation of the differences in compliance among ACs
and with the expected sign. However, in SDMs, a change in the explanatory variable
of a region has an effect on the same region (direct effect) and, potentially, an effect
on all the other regions (indirect effect) via the spatial multiplier mechanism.
Because of this, the spatial interrelations which appear in these models are complex
and the interpretation of the effect of each variable zi y zj cannot simply be done
using its regression coefficient but requires estimating the direct effects,17 the indi-
rect effects,18 and the total effects, as a sum of the previous ones (LeSage and Pace
2009). Meanwhile, when using a dynamic model, all these effects are determined in
the short and long term, as can be seen in Table 2.
Both short- and long-term effects are significant, although the long-term coeffi-
cients of the variables are greater. In the short term, the direct effects of the expla-
natory variables are generally greater than the indirect effects and in the long term
the contrary usually happens. Anyway, the relevance of the direct and indirect
effects confirms the need to introduce spatial analysis in the study of regional tax
compliance. For the sake of simplicity, we will now focus on short-term effects.
The coefficients of two variables measuring the opportunity for tax evasion (or, to
put it another way, the probability of detecting evader behavior) have been shown to
be significant in the model and with the sign predicted in theory and mainly con-
firmed by the empirical evidence (Alm 2019). First, if the percentage of small
companies in a region, specifically without salaried workers (pcompnowork),
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increases by 1 percentage point, IRPF compliance in this region is reduced by 0.63
percentage points, with the weight of small companies in other regions (indirect
effect) being less relevant than that of one’s own region (direct effect). This result is
a clear sign of the higher level of evasion in this business segment, as it is subject to
less scrutiny by the Tax Agency, which tends to focus more on large companies.
Carfora, Vega, and Pisani (2018) also find a negative relationship between company
size and evasion in Italy. Second, if the weight of income subject to withholding
(withholding) in an AC increases by 1 percentage point, the level of IRPF compli-
ance in the AC increases by 0.20 percentage points. This result is a direct conse-
quence of the third-party information system, that is, the obligation for those paying
certain incomes (from capital, professional activities, and especially, labor income)
to apply withholding to the amounts they pay and report it to the tax authority. This
system of withholdings raises the probability of detection of concealed income to
100 percent, which by necessity increases tax compliance.
As for the variables relating to fines, the model shows that if revenue from IRPF
audits in relation to tax collection (auditrevenue) increases by 1 percentage point in
an AC, tax compliance rises in this region by 0.39 percentage points. This result is in
line with those documented in the literature for other countries (Plumley 1996; Alm
and Yunus 2009; Di Caro and Nicotra 2014; and Carfora, Vega, and Pisani 2018,
among others).
An increase by 1 percentage point in the average tax rate applied to income in the
region (averagetr) reduces compliance by 0.13 percentage points, although only
the direct effect is significant (and only in the short term). The low significance
of the coefficient of this variable can be a reflection of the fact that in the
Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki model, the empirical evidence is not conclusive.
Among the papers dealing with tax compliance at the regional level, Dubin, Graetz,
and Wilde (1990), Gentry and Kahn (2009), and Di Caro and Nicotra (2014) find a
negative relationship between tax rate and compliance, while Alm and Yunus (2009)
obtain a positive relationship.19
With respect to the variables that capture the citizens’ attitude to evasion, the
model shows that when citizens in a region have less tax morale, measured as the
number of people convicted per thousand inhabitants (sentenced), compliance is
lower. Plumley (1996) and Dubin (2007) find that convictions for economic offences
reduce evasion in the United States, and Carfora, Vega, and Pisani (2018) find a
positive relationship between the rate of offences and evasion in Italy.
Concerning the relationship between spending, taxes, and tax compliance, a
positive sign of the coefficients of satis and management suggest that when the
citizens in the region are satisfied with the public services they use and with their
management, the level of tax compliance is 0.56 and 0.30 percentage points higher,
respectively, than if there is no satisfaction. The variable balance shows that if the
difference between what a region receives from the central government and what it
contributes, in relation to GDP, increases by 1 percentage point, IRPF compliance
increases by 0.06 percentage points in that region i (direct effect). However, if the
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fiscal balance is improved in the other regions, compliance in the region i is reduced
by 0.15 percentage points (indirect effect), which includes the local indirect effect
which captures the response of taxpayers in the region i who feel disadvantaged
compared to the residents of neighboring regions. This way, the total effect of this
variable on the endogenous one is negative. Similarly, Gütz, Levati, and Sausgruber
(2005) provide experimental evidence for Germany that the citizens living in terri-
tories which make large net contributions to the federal budget have lower tax
morale. Differences in income between ACs and differences in the treatment
received by ACs in the central government’s revenue and expenditure policy are a
core issue of concern in the public debate in Spain. This surely helps to explain the
sign and significance of the coefficient of the balance variable. In view of the
information on decentralization, regional inequalities and mobility provided in
Introduction of this article, it does not seem to be such an important factor in other
federations such as the United States or Switzerland.
The coefficients of the political variables considered in the estimates are not
significant, while the institutional variables are very relevant in the model. The
2012 tax amnesty has a clear effect of reducing compliance, which is indicating that
the harmful effects that the tax amnesty may have on normally honest individuals
seem weigh more than its apparent advantage, such as the relatively rapid recovery
of tax liabilities and the inclusion of new taxpayers in the tax authorities’ records.20
However, the 2007 tax reform has favored tax compliance, perhaps due to the low-
ering of tax rates, which especially affected the highest incomes.
A number of variables relating to decentralization have a significant coefficient.
On one hand, dcession suggests that increasing the assigned percentage of the IRPF
from 33 percent to 50 percent since 2009 has raised the level of tax compliance. This
result is in line with Torgler and Werner (2005) and Torgler, Schneider, and Schal-
tegger (2010), who found that greater local autonomy in Germany and Switzerland
means higher tax morale and higher compliance. Nevertheless, our result must be
interpreted with caution, as we are measuring decentralization by a dummy, which
could also be capturing other things. On the other hand, when a region uses its
regulatory powers to raise the tax (raisedtr), tax compliance is reduced. This result
is corroborated by the significance and negative sign of the coefficient of the vari-
able representing the maximum marginal tax rate set by each region (maxtr).
The negative sign of the coefficient of the variable crisis shows that tax com-
pliance has a pro-cyclical behavior, as would be expected theoretically, and as
shown in the empirical evidence (Dubin and Wilde 1988; Alm and Yunus 2009,
among others). In periods of economic crisis, many people, especially those with
financial problems, tend to work in the black economy and not declare their income.
If the model ignored the spatial and dynamic components, most of the coeffi-
cients of the variables in the model would cease to be significant and, therefore,
would no longer explain tax compliance (auditrevenues, averagetr, sentenced, satis,
management, damnesty, maxregtr, raisedtr, dcession, and crisis); and the weight of
the coefficients of the variables that remain significant in the model would change.
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Specifically, on the one hand, the variable balance would change its sign by captur-
ing only the direct effect of the “fiscal balance” in each region and therefore ignoring
its indirect effect on neighboring regions, which, as seen, is negative and quantita-
tively greater. On the other hand, if the percentage of companies without salaried
workers rises, the predicted reduction in tax compliance in the spatial and dynamic
model is 1.08 times smaller than it is in a regular ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimate (0.63 vs. 0.68). And if the weight of income subject to withholding
rises, the predicted reduction in tax compliance in the spatial and dynamic model is
2.45 times smaller than it is in a regular OLS estimate (0.2 vs. 0.49).
Concluding Remarks
This article was intended to make some useful contributions to the empirical liter-
ature on tax compliance. First, this research is the first quantification of IRPF
compliance in Spanish regions. A macroeconomic approach was used (the only
possible with the information currently available), comparing the income reported
by individuals for tax purposes with the income recorded in the household income
accounts of Spanish Regional Accounts. The figures obtained show that tax com-
pliance has increased overall from 2003 to 2014 and that there is little variance in
compliance levels among the regions.
Second, this article joins a very small number of papers that attempt to identify
the factors explaining differences in tax compliance between regions or local entities
in decentralized and federal countries. We do this for the previously calculated
compliance levels of the Autonomous Communities.
In methodological terms, we have tried to make our approach as complete as
possible. As well as including the dynamic and spatial components considered by
Alm and Yunus (2009), we considered three groups of variables that can explain
differences in compliance: the variables included in the tax evasion model of Alling-
ham and Sandmo (1972), tax morale variables, and political-institutional variables,
attributing special importance to those linked to the country’s fiscal decentralization.
The results obtained confirm, on the one hand, those reached in the very extensive
literature studying tax evasion from the individual perspective (including the importance
of the dynamic element), and on the other, the relevance of the spatial component in
explaining tax compliance. This way, both spatiality and persistence must be considered
in order to correctly model tax compliance. Our model also reveals that variables relating
to decentralization, typical of the Spanish institutional framework, are relevant in the
estimate: tax compliance is directly related to the degree of IRPF decentralization and
inversely related to the use of the AC’s regulatory powers to raise the tax.
The significance of persistence and spatiality to explain differences in tax com-
pliance between regions must be carefully considered by the tax administration
when designing the best policies to fight tax evasion. In this regard, it may be useful
to recall the three paradigms for tax administration proposed by Alm (2012, 2019) to
identify policies to improve compliance: “enforcement paradigm,” which focuses on
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policies to increase detection and punishment; “service paradigm,” which focuses on
the services of the tax administration to taxpayers; and “trust paradigm,” which
looks for a change in the culture of paying taxes.
Two examples may help to illustrate the above statement. First, the literature
widely agrees that personal income tax evasion is mostly found among entrepreneurs
and professionals (as well as recipients of capital income), but not among salaried
workers, who, being subject to withholding, have little chance of successfully evad-
ing the personal income tax (Alm 2012, 2019; for Spain, Domı́nguez-Barrero,
López-Laborda, and Rodrigo-Sauco 2017). Our own estimates suggest that when
income is subject to withholding, tax compliance is higher. Consequently, and as
shown by the relevance and significance of the coefficient of the spatial lag (r), we
think our estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that certain groups of tax-
payers, such as professionals, entrepreneurs, or executives, are aware of the activity
of the Tax Agency and the degree of compliance of these same collectives in other
regions, especially the neighboring ones and that this information affects the deci-
sions they make about their own degree of compliance, in such a way that greater tax
compliance in neighboring ACs is associated with greater compliance in one’s own
AC.21 These externalities must be taken into account by the tax administration when
designing and implementing its audit policy in each region, in accordance with the
enforcement paradigm.
And second, the relevance and significance of the coefficients of the balance
variable also suggest that citizens translate into their tax behavior the perception they
have of how their own AC, and other ACs are treated by central government inter-
vention through its revenue and expenditure policy. Citizens specifically react by
reducing tax compliance when their AC’s fiscal balance is adverse or when they
perceive that central government treats other regions better. In consequence, central
government should clearly inform and explain to citizens about the taxes it requires
and the services it provides in each AC, and what the inequalities they perceive are
due to. The literature shows that, in general (and with the notable exception of the
foral regions, due to their special status), and as might be expected, such differences
arise from differences in income and population between regions (Uriel and
Barberán 2015). An appropriate step in this direction is the elaboration and publi-
cation by the central government of the System of Territorialized Public Accounts
(Sistema de Cuentas Públicas Territorializadas; see https://www.hacienda.gob.es/es-
ES/CDI/Paginas/OtraInformacionEconomica/Sistema-cuentas-territorializadas-
2014.aspx), which provides a detailed picture of the territorial distribution of public
budgets on both the revenue and expenditure sides. This kind of information and
pedagogy exercise by governments could help to increase the tax compliance of the
citizens, and it would fit perfectly into the trust paradigm.
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Notes
1. Conventional regression models commonly used to analyze panel data assume that
observations are independent of one another. However, when observations are collected
from points or regions located in space, usually arises dependence between observations,
what is precisely what happens in the case at hand. Ignoring this violation of indepen-
dence between observations will produce estimates that are biased and inconsistent
(LeSage and Pace 2009 present multiple technical arguments justifying the use of spatial
methods).
2. Papers such as Dubin (2007), Kleven et al. (2011), and Advani, Elming, and Shaw (2017)
consider the dynamic effect that audits may have on tax compliance.
3. The common regime Comunidades Autónomas (ACs) finance their expenditure with
ceded taxes and grants from the central government. In addition to the Impuesto sobre
la Renta de las Personas Fı́sicas (IRPF), other taxes such as wealth tax, inheritance and
gift tax, value-added tax (with a share of 50 percent), or excise duties (with a share of 58
percent), among others, are also ceded to the ACs. At present, ceded taxes and other own
revenues amount to 80 percent of nonfinancial revenues for all the ACs under the com-
mon regime; grants represent the remaining 20 percent. For more details on the financing
of the Spanish ACs and the differences between the common and foral regimes, see
López-Laborda and Monasterio (2007) and Zabalza and López-Laborda (2011).
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4. They performed an estimate by instrumental variables (Anselin 1988), followed by a
nonparametric method (filtering) to treat the spatial dependence, and a GMM estimation
(in combination with filtering) to address the dynamic aspects of the evasion decision.
5. In fact, there are hardly any estimates of tax compliance in any tax, even at the national
level. For a review of the scarce research in this area, see Domı́nguez-Barrero, López-
Laborda, and Rodrigo-Sauco (2015). In other countries there are official estimates of this
issue: see, for example, for the United States, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/the-tax-gap;
for the UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/measuring-tax-gaps; or for Aus-
tralia, https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/Research-and-statistics/In-detail/Tax-gap/.
6. On methods of estimating tax compliance, see Alm (2012), Slemrod and Weber (2012),
and Slemrod (2017).
7. Although by measuring tax compliance in this way we are not capturing the underpay-
ment gap, this generally represents a fairly small portion of tax evasion. For example, in
the United States, nonfiling gap and underreporting gap represent about 90 percent of the
federal gross tax gap: see https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf. We thank a referee
for this observation.
8. The SEC-2010 provides the rules, definitions, nomenclatures, and accounting standards
that should be used for the preparation of the accounts of each member state, on com-
parable bases for the needs of the European Union.
9. For example, we have eliminated from the denominator of the quotient (real income)
the income of the nonfilers receiving income below a certain threshold because of being
outside the population scope of the numerator (fiscal income). We have approached
them using the Survey on Job Market and Pensions in Tax Sources (Encuesta sobre
Mercado de Trabajo y Pensiones en las Fuentes Tributarias) published by the Tax
Agency (Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, Ministry of Finance). We have
also eliminated from the denominator the income attributed to the owners who inhabit
their own homes, since no income is declared for the primary dwelling in the IRPF
(numerator). We have obtained this data from the Survey on Living Conditions
(Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida) published by the National Statistics Institute (Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estadı́stica).
10. Alm and Yunus (2009) do not take this issue into account.
11. The empirical literature uses inspection rates or audited tax returns as indicators of the
probability of detection, but this information has not been available to us.
12. Surcharges required for the collection of expired and unpaid tax debts during the volun-
tary payment period.
13. The variable mintr is highly correlated with maxtr (Table 3.1A), so it has been excluded
from the estimates.
14. The variable unemploy was not included in the model because it is quite correlated with
maxtr (Table 3.1A).
15. We have checked the robustness of the weight matrix applied, varying the definition of
neighbors from 2 to 6. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. The
results have not varied significantly, but according to the Bayesian and Akaike’s infor-
mation criteria, the best model is the one we have described in the text.
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16. Because not all the models are comparable under this criterion.
17. Direct effects, which capture the influence of an independent variable z of the region i on
compliance C in the region i, include the feedback effect produced because it also affects
its neighbors, and this change in nearby regions also leads to changes in region i. This is
because the neighboring regions have other neighbors in turn, which can influence i
(LeSage and Page 2009 and Fischer et al. 2009).
18. Indirect effects measure the influence on the dependent variable in a region i of changes
in an independent variable z in a different region j. Using a Durbin model, two types of
indirect effects can be distinguished, produced by the interdependence between the units.
One is a local spatial effect, in the sense that it arises from changes in the explanatory
variables of neighboring regions, through wzjs; the other is a global spatial effect, as it
arises from changes in explanatory variables in all the regions, even if they are not
neighbors, but which also affect compliance in i through the endogenous term rwC. The
local spatial effect does not have a dynamization effect like that generated by the presence
of r (LeSage and Page 2009). Both (local and global) effects cannot be differentiated.
19. Plumley (1996) finds that marginal rates for low incomes, $15,000, favor compliance,
while for high incomes, $57,000, they are dissuasive.
20. The literature reveals a significant heterogeneity as regards both the estimated sign and
size of the coefficient of this variable: see López-Laborda and Rodrigo (2003).
21. Although, as suggested by a referee, ordinary spillovers, measurement errors, or unob-
served spatial variables that affect compliance could generate the same pattern, we think
this possibility is unlikely in a context such as ours with no spatial dependence in the error
term and including fixed effects, which minimize the biases from omitted variables.
References
Adalet, M., and J. San Millán. 2019. “Reducing Regional Disparities for Inclusive Growth in
Spain.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1549, OECD, Paris, France.
Advani, A., W. Elming, and J. Shaw. 2017. “The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits.” Working
Paper No. W17/24, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, UK. Accessed July 10, 2020.
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/9996.
Allingham, M., and A. Sandmo. 1972. “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.”
Journal of Public Economics 1 (3-4): 323–38.
Alm, J. 2012. “Measuring, Explaining, and Controlling Tax Evasion: Lessons from Theory,
Experiments, and Field Studies.” International Tax and Public Finance 19:54–77.
Alm, J. 2019. “What Motivates Tax Compliance?” Journal of Economic Surveys 33 (2):
353–88.
Alm, J., K. M. Bloomquist, and M. McKee. 2017. “When You Know Your Neighbour Pays
Taxes: Information, Peer Effects and Tax Compliance.” Fiscal Studies 38 (4): 587–613.
Alm, J., and J. Soled. 2017. “W(h)ither the Tax Gap?” Accessed May 31, 2020. https://ssrn.
com/abstract¼2978215http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2978215.
Alm, J., and M. Yunus. 2009. “Spatiality and Persistence in U.S. Individual Income Tax
Compliance.” National Tax Journal 62 (1): 101–24.
26 International Regional Science Review XX(X)
Andreoni, J., B. Erard, and J. Feldstein. 1998. “Tax Compliance.” Journal of Economic
Literature 36:818–60.
Anselin, L. 1988. Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Dordrecht, the Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Anselin, L. 2002. “Under the Hood: Issues in the Specification and Interpretation of Spatial
Regression Models.” Agricultural Economics 27 (3): 247–67.
Belotti, F., G. Hughes, and A. P. Mortari. 2017. “Spatial Panel-data Models Using Stata.” The
Stata Journal 17 (1): 139–80.
Benabou, R., and J. Tirole. 2011. “Laws and Norms.” NBER Working Paper No. 17579,
National Bureau for Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Besley, T., A. Jensen, and T. Persson. 2019. “Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion.” NBER
Working Paper No. 25575, National Bureau for Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Caldera-Sánchez, A., and D. Andrews. 2011. “To Move or Not to Move: What Drives
Residential Mobility Rates in the OECD?” OECD Economics Department Working
Papers No. 846, OECD, Paris, France.
Carfora, A., R. Vega, and S. Pisani. 2018. “Regional Tax Evasion and Audit Enforcement.”
Regional Studies 52 (3): 362–73.
Comisión del Fraude Fiscal [Tax Fraud Commission]. 1988. Evaluación del fraude en el
Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Fı́sicas. Ejercicios 1979-1986. Madrid, Spain:
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
Congdon, W. J., J. R. Kling, and S. Mullainathan. 2011. Policy and Choice: Public Finance
through the Lens of Behavioral Economics. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Di Caro, P., and G. Nicotra. 2014. “Knowing the Unknown across Regions: Spatial Variation
in Italy.” Social Science Research Network. Accessed July 10, 2020. file:///E:/Usuarios/
usuario/Downloads/SSRN-id2446803.pdf.
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